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1. The Strategy of Effective Multilateralism and the Choice for
Collective Security
The European Security Strategy (ESS), the first ever common strategic document of the EU,
adopted by the European Council in December 2003, accords a central place to the collective
security system of the UN. The best way of summarizing the ESS is through ‘effective
multilateralism’,  the  last  of  the  three  strategic  objectives  that  the  document  outlines.
‘Effective multilateralism’, defined by the ESS as ‘the development of a stronger international
society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’,
concerns the global order, the world system itself. As such, it aims to address the long-term
underlying factors determining peace and security (Biscop, 2005). At the same time the
Strategy strongly stresses that for ‘international organisations, regimes and treaties to be
effective’  the  EU  must  be  ‘ready  to  act  when  their  rules  are  broken’.  ‘Effective
multilateralism’ thus appears to imply enforceable multilateralism. In the words of Christoph
Heusgen (2004, p.7), Director of the Policy Unit of High Representative Javier Solana:
‘Military intervention, however, is only the last resort of EU policy’. The emphasis clearly is
on long-term stabilization and on a gradual approach towards – emerging – crises putting to
use the full range of instruments at the disposal of the EU.
For  the  EU,  in  achieving  ‘effective  multilateralism’,  the  UN  is  the  central  actor:  ‘The
fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United
Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace  and  security’.  The  EU  opts  for  the  collective  security  system;  accordingly,
‘Strengthening  the  United  Nations,  equipping  it  to  fulfil  its  responsibilities  and  to  act
effectively, is a European priority’. Nevertheless, the ESS, which was drafted in the wake of
the Iraq crisis, was criticized for not expressly saying that in principle the EU should seek a
UN mandate for coercive military action. It can pragmatically be understood to imply that ‘in
emergency situations immediate action is not always compatible with a formal application of
international public law’ (Haine, 2004, p.110). In other words, the ESS can be interpreted as
allowing a Kosovo scenario. A look at state practice reveals however that all Member States
are willing to use force if necessary, and some have a stronger tradition of intervention than
others, often related to a colonial past – e.g. France in Ivory Coast, the UK in Sierra Leone,
Belgium in Central Africa – but none regards the use of force as a first-line instrument and all
prefer to do so with a UN mandate. The adoption of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction by the December 2003 European Council, which provides for a
long-term and comprehensive approach, bears witness to this consensus (Spear, 2003). In this
document the EU renders explicit that ‘coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter and international law’ can only be considered when other instruments have failed, and
that  the  Security  Council  (UNSC)  is  ‘the  final  arbiter  on  the  consequences  of  non-3
compliance’. Even the intra-European divide over Iraq in early 2003 did not essentially
concern the collective security system. The real issue at stake rather appeared to be the
relationship with the US. If in a situation in which the EU would not apply force – yet – the
US decides to do so, where do Europe’s priorities lie: in upholding its own principles or in
supporting its foremost ally?
In view of its attachment to collective security, the EU welcomed the creation by Secretary-
General Koffi Annan at the end of 2003 of a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change with the aim of recommending ‘clear and practical measures for ensuring effective
collective action’. In May 2004 the Council approved for the transferral to the Panel a Paper
for  Submission  to  the  High-Level  Panel  on  Threats,  Challenges  and  Change,  which
emphasizes the primary role of the UNSC in a much more explicit way than the ESS: ‘In the
view of the EU, it should remain for the Security Council, in accordance with its primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to decide on the
appropriate response to the risks in any situation that is brought to its attention, and to form a
judgement on the appropriate course of action in any given situation.’
Through its contribution to the work of the Panel, the EU thus further clarified its own
position, even though the status of this EU submission to the High-Level Panel is perhaps
debatable: some regard it more as an academic contribution than as an official EU position.
The Panel’s report itself, which was submitted to the Secretary General on 1 December 2004,
is remarkably close to the comprehensive approach of the EU: it adopts a wide definition of
security, including social, economic and environmental issues, and strongly emphasizes
prevention, which in the Panel’s view begins with development. With regard to contingencies
that warrant coercive measures, the Panel (p.13) reaffirms the validity of the Charter: ‘In all
cases, we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is
equal to the task: Article 51 needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood
scope, and Chapter VII fully empowers the Security Council to deal with every kind of threat
that States may confront. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a
source of authority but to make it work better than it has.’
Accordingly, the EU very much welcomed the Panel’s report and commended the Secretary-
General, who personally presented it to the December 2004 European Council, ‘for his
leadership and vision’. In view of the exemplary function of the EU, one can indeed regret
that the principle of UNSC authorization was not expressly included in the ESS – who else
would send such a clear message in favour of the collective security system if not the EU?
Clearly though, since the 2003 Iraq crisis and the debate on the UN that it engendered,
through the drafting of the ESS and through its support for the recommendations of the Panel,4
the EU as such under the heading of ‘effective multilateralism’ has emerged as one of the
staunchest supporters of collective security.
2. Effective Multilateralism at the UN: Conceptualizing EU Actorness in
the UNSC
Today, of the 25 EU Member States, only France and the UK are represented on a permanent
basis in the UNSC. The remaining Member States may obtain a seat for two years if they are
elected  by  the  UNGA  regional  groups.  What  does  this  mean  for  the  EU’s  presence?
Following Allen and Smith, the notion of presence refers to ‘the ability to exert influence, to
shape the perceptions and expectations of others’ (Allen & Smith 1990, 19-34). In recent
years, scholars have often enclosed this notion in a broader framework, applying the concept
of actorness to describe and evaluate the EU as an international actor (Hill 1996, Jupille &
Caporaso 1998, Vogler 1999, Ginsberg 2001, Laatikainen 2002, Vogler 2002, Joleka 2002).
For a definition, these scholars still refer to the definition of ‘actor capacity’ Sjöstedt gave in
1977, namely ‘the capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to others in the
international  system’.  In  1998,  Jupille  and  Caporaso  operationalised  the  concept  and
established four criteria for evaluating actor capacity: recognition, authority, autonomy and
cohesion (Jupille & Caporaso 1998, 214-221).
According to Jupille and Caporaso, recognition  by  third  parties  of  EU  competence  is  a
‘minimum condition’ for global actorhood as it allows for presence. Such external or outside
recognition does not necessarily imply diplomatic recognition under international law of the
EU or formal EU membership of an international organisation (de iure or formal recognition).
It may also be the result of third parties interacting with the EU rather than with the individual
Member States (de facto or informal recognition). In the UNSC, the degree to which such
indirect recognition is possible is dependent upon the degree to which the relationship
between the EU Member States and the European members of the UNSC can be defined in
terms of principals and agents. As here not only the notions of authority and autonomy pop
up, but also the notion of cohesion, the status-quo of EU actorness in the UNSC provides a
clear illustration of the degree to which the four dimensions of actorness as proposed by
Jupille and Caporaso are interlinked.
In the current stage of integration, the EU does not have the legal competence or authority to
act on behalf of the EU Member States in the UNSC. Yet, the fact that the EU does not have a
seat in the UNSC does not mean that there are no legal  impulses for the EU Member States in
the UNSC to speak with a common voice. Indeed, as stipulated in article 19(2) of the Treaty
on European Union, EU member states who are also members of the UNSC should ‘concert’
and keep their colleague member states ‘fully informed’ about their activities. In addition,
those European member states participating as permanent members in the UNSC should also5
‘ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union’.  However, they have to do
this ‘without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations
Charter’.
Moreover, in contrast to recognition, authority, cohesion, and autonomy are active dimensions
of actorness, meaning that they can be directly influenced by EU decision-making. As
authority refers to the legal competence of the EU to act externally, the EU Member States
can change the legal basis for acting externally by amending the Treaty. Moreover, in practice
the interaction of cohesion and autonomy may create a situation of indirect  authority and
positively influence the degree to which the EU can be seen as an international actor, without
Treaty reform. Indeed, the degree to which the relationship between the EU Member States in
the Council and the European members of the UNSC, as defined by article 19(2) TEU, can be
characterised as a relationship between principals and agents in which the agents strictly
resound  the  coordinated  position  of  the  principals  (i.e.  the  perfect  principal-agent
relationship), can create a situation of de facto pooled international representation. Indeed, if
the EU member states reach a coordinated position at the level of the EU and the European
members of the UNSC echo this position at the UNSC, countries like the US, China and
Russia are sitting round the UNSC table with a number of European discussion partners who
strike the same note, creating a negotiation context resembling one of bilateral cooperation
between the EU and these countries in a multilateral context. In contrast, in case the outcome
of the internal coordination is not a coordinated position, there is also the possibility that these
countries face a number of – maximum four – European discussion partners who may all
strike different notes, resulting in a situation of multilateral cooperation in a multilateral
context. This may also be the case if the EU member states do reach a coordinated position at
the level of the EU, but if the European members of the UNSC do not echo this position at the
UNSC. In other words, for a perfect principal-agent relationship, two conditions have to be
fulfilled. First, the principals have to succeed in reaching a common position. Secondly, the
agents have to resound this position strictly at the UNSC. Whereas the first condition fits in
with the cohesion  dimension  of  actorness,  the  second  condition  is  in  keeping  with  the
autonomy one.
With regard to the question of autonomy, according to Jupille and Caporaso the degree of
delegation of authority by the principals is a conditio sine qua non (Jupille & Caporaso 1998,
pp.216-217). In recent years, a growing number of scholars have applied principal-agent
insights in the study of the EU to conceptualize and explain the delegation of negotiating
authority from the Member States to EU institutions (Ballmann, Epstein & O’Halloran 2002;
Kassim & Menon 2003; Meunier 2000; Pollack 2003). Scholars applying these insights to the
study of EU external relations have mainly focused on external trade policy (Kerremans 2004,
Nicolaïdis 1999). In external trade negotiations Member States (principals) mostly delegate6
negotiation authority to the Commission (agent) according to the procedure prescribed in
articles  133  TEC  and  300  TEC.  In  comparision  to  these  negotiations,  when  applying
principal-agent concepts to decision-making in the UNSC, two things have to be kept in
mind. First and foremost, as appears from the wording of article 19(2) TEU,  the delegation of
negotiating authority – in practice:  by the Council  or the Political and Security Committee
(PSC) – is neither formalised nor institutionalised. As a formal negotiating mandate is not
provided for in the TEU, and Member States in the UNSC have to defend EU common
positions without prejudice to their responsibilities under the UN Charter, delegation is an
option and will always be informal. Consequently, the agents may not only have incentives to
act autonomously, but also the possibility to do so. Secondly, whereas in case of external
trade negotiations there is mostly only one agent, here, there are a number of countries  who
could be assigned the role of agents. In addition, being a subset of the principals, they are
always part of the decision to delegate negotiating autonomy and can thus directly influence
cohesion. For this reason, these member states could be in a position to develop a de facto
initiating right in the Council, becoming first movers in EU decision-making.
Today, in most of the debates planned in the UNSC, the EU is directly represented by the
Presidency, which is invited to participate in the meetings without voting rights and makes a
statement on behalf of the EU, to which the other Member States routinely refer. Most of the
time not only the candidate countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey), but also the
countries participating in the Stabilisation and Association Process (Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro) as
well as the EFTA-countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) align themselves with these
statements. Administratively, since 1994 Member States’ and especially the Presidency’s
delegations are supported by the Council’s Liaison Office in New York (NYLO). The NYLO
assists the Presidency in its task of coordinating between the 25, providing secretariat services
and functioning as the institutional memory. In 2004, 39 Presidency Statements were issued,
of which 25 on specific states and regions and 14 on horizontal issues. In comparison, in
2001, 2002 and 2003, the Presidency delivered respectively 45, 38 and 32 statements. The
items covered in 2004 included: the Balkans (8), West and Central Africa (5), the Middle East
(4), Timor (4), Afghanistan (2), Sudan (1) and Haiti (1), as well as terrorism (5) and non-
proliferation (2), and issues in the field of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-
conflict reconstruction (7). Moreover, in 2004, the EU Presidency invited EUHR Solana twice
to address the UNSC. Solana invited ESDP Deputy Director-General Peter Feith to speak on
his behalf on cooperation between the UN and regional organisations on 20 July 2004, but
attended the discussion on civilian crisis management on 22 September 2004 himself. The
Presidency  Statements  often  stress  a  number  of  ‘traditional’  EU  priorities,  notably  the
comprehensive approach to security. This involves an integrated use of civilian and military
means, tackling the root causes of terrorism, and the importance of reconciling a stepped up7
fight against terrorism with respect for human rights and the rule of law. The inclusion of a
human rights expert in the Executive Directorate of the UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee
is an example of an EU-propagated measure. Other recurrent items are the need for a regional
approach in dealing with conflicts, the International Criminal Court and stronger cooperation
between the UN and regional organizations.
Yet, as Laatikainen noted, there is a difference between presenting the European view on
certain  issues  before  the  UNSC  and  joint  European  decision-making  in  the  UNSC
(Laatikainen 2003, 424-425). In contrast to the representatives of the European members of
the UNSC, in these sessions, these ‘EU representatives’ do not have voting rights. Moreover,
with regard to actual decision-making, the majority of negotiations on draft resolutions are
conducted by the UNSC members in the margins of and in between these gatherings. As a
result, notwithstanding the fact that the EU has been increasingly visible in the UNSC by the
Presidency delivering statements on behalf of the EU, the degree to which the EU is present
in actual UNSC decision-making is dependent upon on the degree to which the European
members of the UNSC allow for this, i.e. on their autonomy in the application of article 19(2)
TEU. Or, what it boils down to is the degree to which the EU Member States in the UNSC
consider themselves representatives of the EU rather than actors in their own right, i.e.
consider their seats in the UNSC as instruments of EU foreign policy cooperation rather than
as expressions of national sovereinty.
Indeed, for many years, France and the UK have given their obligation to provide information
a minimalist interpretation, limiting themselves to their ambassadors answering the questions
of their colleagues at the weekly meetings of the EU heads of mission in New York. In
January 2001, this changed as the practice of ‘article 19 briefings’ was established on the
initiative of France and Spain. In these weekly briefings chaired by the member state holding
the Presidency, France and the UK inform the permanent missions of the EU Member States
about the ins and outs in the UNSC. Just like it prompted the adoption of the ESS, the Iraq
crisis of early 2003 seems to have given this development a new impulse as EU Member
States are now mostly briefed at an earlier stage on draft resolutions. According to Luif, the
fact that in the summer of 2003 the French and British delegations came up with the idea of
organising weekly ‘forward-looking debates’ on the upcoming UNSC agenda also indicates
that France and the UK are taking the demands of article 19 TEU more seriously (Luif 2003,
16-19; Sucharipa 2003, 786-794). Yet, with the exception of the fact that the EU Member
States having recently agreed on organising extensive consultations at 25 regarding draft
UNSC resolutions providing for the possibility of sanctions against individuals, in view of the
legal difficulties created by the transformation of such resolutions into European and national
legislation, a systematic ex ante coordination between the EU Member States on UNSC
matters is, especially for the UK, still out of the question.8
An additional problem is that EU common positions and/or CFSP declarations/statements
adopted by the EU on topics discussed in the UNSC rarely present the right framework for
representing the EU in the UNSC. As a result, the cohesion thus achieved leaves to be
desired. Firstly, the agenda of the PSC is not very well aligned with the agenda of the UNSC
in New York, although on occasion France in particular attempts to obtain a fixed position
from the PSC in function of its own needs, notably in cases when it can be expected that the
view of Paris will be different from that of London. Secondly, CFSP declarations/statements
are often rather too general for such a purpose. At the same time, as the practice of EU
participation in EU conferences learns, too detailed and rigid EU positions limit the room for
negotiations in the UNSC, which would be unworkable and would therefore probably not be
acceptable to the Member States on the UNSC, specifically France and the UK, who greatly
value their autonomy as permanent members. Thirdly, a personal factor must also be taken
into account: Member States’ permanent representatives in New York, who are among their
most  senior  diplomats,  are  not  always  looking  forward  to  receive  what  may  look  like
‘instructions’ from their most of the time more junior colleagues in the PSC. In consequence,
a balancing act is required: an EU position must not yet have carved every single aspect of a
debate into stone, but must not be so vague either as to give no direction at all. In that respect
it would be useful when issues are up for discussion in the UNSC to include them on the
agenda of the PSC beforehand in order to frame the debate in New York, even if only by
recapitulating EU positions on the issue at hand.
Here,  the  debate  on  the  Presidency  Declaration  on  the  Report  by  the  International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (7 February 2005) can serve as an example of the need to
balance  direction/cohesion and flexibility/autonomy.  Whereas  France  wanted  a  strong
declaration in favour of the Commission’s recommendation to involve the ICC, the UK
preferred more flexibility in view of the need to negotiate with the US, as the latter had
expressed its opposition to the implication of the ICC. As indicated by the following excerpt,
the Declaration adopted confirms the standing EU position but at the same time can be
interpreted  as  leaving  considerable  leeway  to  the  Member  States  on  the  UNSC:  ‘The
Commission of Inquiry recommends that those responsible should answer for their acts before
the International Criminal Court. In this context, the EU reaffirms its constant support for the
International Criminal Court, and reiterates its common position on the ICC, while noting that
it is for the United Nations Security Council to take a rapid decision on this matter.’
There  is  a  strong  consensus  between  the  Member  States  on  the  long-term  strategy of
prevention and stabilization, and the actions that it entails. On the whole it does appear from
Presidency Statements and Member States’ positions in the UNSC that on such issues the EU
acts in a coordinated/cohesive manner, and that its voice is heard/recognized by the other
members. In this regard the UN setting does not seem to present any particular difficulties for9
the EU. Only exceptionally do the Member States on the UNSC vote divided on such issues;
e.g. in 2004 on two occasions (25 March and 4 October) France and Spain voted in favour of
a draft Resolution condemning certain actions by Israel, while Germany and the UK, although
agreeing on the substance, abstained for a lack of balance in the text, which made no mention
of equally unjustifiable actions by Palestinian extremists. Rather the caveat that does apply is
valid for CFSP/ESDP as such: the ability of the EU to act as one in response to crisis
situations will remain doubtful as long as the Member States rest divided over the degree of
autonomy of the EU as an international actor. That in some cases Member States prefer
national policies is not really problematic, as long as these are consistent with the policies of
the EU, e.g. French and British involvement in Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone. Fundamental is
that as long as some Member States continue to look to Washington for guidance first rather
than coordinate within the EU, the latter cannot be a resolute actor or develop the ‘strategic
culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention’ called for in the
ESS. When, as a consequence of this divide over the degree of EU autonomy vis-à-vis the US
and NATO, cohesion is lacking and the EU is divided internally on the need for action, it is
absent from the debates in the UNSC, e.g. with regard to Iraq. As the current system of EU
representation allows for great autonomy, the individual Member States in the UNSC are then
free to voice their – contradictory – positions. Whether the EU acts resolutely in crisis
situations, in the UN and elsewhere, will have to be judged on a case-by-case basis. The
conditions for establishing EU actorness in the UNSC do not differ from the conditions for
establishing general EU actorness in the framework of the CFSP and ESDP, on the contrary.
3. New impulses for a uniform EU representation in the UNSC?
In the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) most of the rules concerning
EU coordination in international organisations like the UN remain similar (article III-305).
New is that the EU foreign minister will be responsible for organising ‘the coordination’ in
international organisations, a task that is currently reserved for the EU Presidency (article I-28
TCE). Also, when only some EU Member States are member of a certain international
organisation, the foreign minister, like the other Member States, shall be kept informed. The
same goes for the Member States who are – permanent or elected – member of the UNSC.
These countries have to defend the EU positions and interests in the execution of their
functions. However, still without prejudice to their responsibilities following the UN Charter.
Also new is that in case the EU has defined ‘a position’ on a subject which is on the UNSC’s
agenda, the Member States sitting on the UNSC shall request that the foreign minister is
asked ‘to present it’. In this regard, according to the draft constitution, the future European
Council President shall, ‘at his or her level’, ‘ensure the external representation of the Union
on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers
of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’ (article I-22). As a result, it remains to see whether
he or she might not consider the UNSC to be precisely ‘at his or her level’.10
As he or she will combine the functions of EUHR en Commissioner for external relations, the
draft constitution envisages a strong role for the future European Union Minister for Foreign
Affairs. As chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and Vice-President of the Commission, a
powerful Minister would be able to act as engine of external action in all of its dimensions
and stimulate cohesion. The involvement of the Minister could increase consistency in the
EU’s  representation  in  the  UN,  as  compared  to  the  current  mechanism  of  inviting  the
(rotating) Presidency. Presumably the Minister could appoint a permanent representative in
New York, making use of the system of Special Representatives, who could represent him at
all debates. This envoy could be included in the delegation of one of the Member States on the
UNSC,  perhaps  on  the  basis  of  a  rotation  scheme.  This  way,  the  EU  would  acquire  a
permanent voice in UNSC meetings and be able to increase its actorness without having to
change the UN framework. From an administrative point of view, in Brussels, the foreign
minister will be supported by a European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS)  comprising
officials  from  the  Council,  the  Commission  and  the  member  states.  In  line  with  the
philosophy behind the creation of the EEAS, the Council and Commission delegations to the
UN in New York could be merged and reinforced, in order to strengthen their role as
guardians of EU positions. This would also be to the advantage of the smaller member states
in the UNSC, as they could replenish their limited diplomatic resources by appealing to the
delegation of the External Action Service.
Yet, since the Constitution does not provide for formal delegation of authority, the key role in
the negotiation of resolutions will continue to be played by the Member States in the UNSC
who will retain a large degree of autonomy. The issue is often said to be solved by the
creation of a single EU seat in the UNSC. On 24 March 2003, in an interview with Die Welt,
also EUHR Javier Solana alluded to this. According to Solana, as differences of opinion had
been  running  exactly  between  the  four  European  members  of  the  UNSC,  a  possible
explanation for the Iraq saga within the UN in the spring of 2003 could have been the lack of
a single EU representation in the UNSC: ‘The EU is not represented by one seat in the UN.
Yet, the problems started in the UN. What makes it difficult for the EU and me is that the EU
has four members in the UNSC. (..) Imagine what influence Europe could have had if it had
spoken with one voice. The lesson we learnt is that Europe is losing influence when it does
not speak with one voice’ (Solana 2003). One year later, Solana put it as follows: ‘If France
and  the  UK  do  not  reach  a  common  position,  there  will  be  no  common  EU  position.
Therefore, I advise all permanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC to be aware that
they are not just representing their own country but also representing the spirit of the EU – or
at least should be representing the spirit of the EU’(Solana 2004).  The Iraq crisis thus not
only  greatly  influenced  the  drafting  of  an  ESS,  but  also  intensified  the  debate  on  the
institutional dimension of the EU’s representation in New York.11
The support for a single EU representation in international organizations like the UN follows
from the idea that such form of representation will increase the bargaining power of the EU in
these organizations. Furthermore, if the EU is represented by a single seat, the Member States
will have to choose between the adoption of a common position or being absent from the
debate altogether. In consequence, cohesion would be stimulated, while the problem of the
autonomy of individual EU Member States on the UNSC would no longer pose itself. Of
course, as Frieden remarked, by itself, pooled representation does not necessarily increase the
EU influence over bargained outcomes (Frieden 2004, 262-274). The degree to which pooled
EU representation affects bargaining outcomes is sensitive to many features of the European
and  international  environment,  including  the  number  of  countries  involved  and  the
distribution of their preferences, and the voting rules applied, both inside the EU and UNSC.
Indeed, that speaking with a single voice does not necessarily results in an increase in
bargaining power, has also already been acknowledged by the European Commission in the
autumn of 2003: “While the EU has moved progressively towards speaking with a common
voice in UN debates, its real influence – and its ability to project European values – on the
world stage still falls short of its economic and combined political weight, or indeed its
contribution to the funding of UN organizations” (COM(2003)526, 3). Moreover, as UN
membership is still reserved for states, the creation of a single and permanent EU seat in the
UNSC implies a profound institutional reform of the UN system.
4. Bringing ‘Effective Multilateralism’ into Practice: Spreading the Word
As one of the members of the High-Level Panel, Lord David Hannay (2005), noted, ‘the fit
between the Panel’s proposals and EU objectives is astonishingly close’, a fact which, as he
emphasises, has consequences:
‘But this presents the EU with a fundamental challenge: can its foreign policy move beyond
warm words and fine-sounding communiqués to action; and can it deploy its influence to
convince less enthusiastic members to move forward?’
As is has proclaimed itself the defender of collective security, and with two of the permanent
members in its ranks, the EU is indeed one of the primary addressees of the High-Level Panel
report, and is rightfully expected to contribute in very concrete terms to the functioning of the
UN. As Kofi Annan (2004) said to the European Council: ‘As we move ahead, full European
engagement will be essential. […] the world now looks to you to support a global multilateral
framework’ – a clear indication of the degree of recognition of the EU.
A first contribution which the EU can make is promoting the reinvigoration of the collective
security  system  as  advocated  by  the  High-Level  Panel  and  the  implementation  of  the12
necessary measures to that end, through the multi- and bilateral political dialogue in its
elaborate range of regional partnerships and with its partner countries. The EU could try to
reach out to Russia and China, whose support for collective security as permanent members is
vital. It should not be forgotten that for many Southern members of the UN several aspects of
the Panel’s recommendations are highly controversial (Berdal, 2004, p.95); diplomacy is
needed to ensure their continued commitment. Significantly, following the release of the
Panel’s report, the EU as such entered into a direct dialogue with the US on issues relating to
collective security which had not been the subject of EU-US meetings before. In the first
place the Panel’s recommendations themselves were the topic of direct talks in the run-up to
the September 2005 Millennium+5 Summit. But the EU also started coordination with the US
in  the  field  of  development  and  in  the  field  of  conflict  prevention  and  post-conflict
reconstruction created a desk-to-desk dialogue with the new Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization in the US State Department. In both areas coordination
efforts are undertaken in function of the agenda of the UN. Once again, this development
demonstrates that EU actorness on UN issues has increased through its commitment to the
reinvigoration of collective security launched after the Iraq crisis.
5. ‘Effective Multilateralism’ in the Field
The second contribution of the EU must of course be in the field. The first major step to a
concrete partnership with the UN in the field of security was the adoption, by the June 2001
Göteborg European Council, of a declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Conflict Prevention
and Crisis Management, which named three priority areas: conflict prevention, the civilian
and military aspects of crisis management, and particular regional issues (the Balkans, the
Middle East, the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and West Africa). In the field of
conflict prevention and early warning, both the EU and the UN have created extensive
instruments for the worldwide monitoring of developments, the effectiveness of which can
only  increase  by  combining  the  assembled  information.  On  24  September  2003  both
organizations signed a joint declaration on cooperation in crisis management, with the aim of
increasing coordination and compatibility of mission planning units, training, communication
and best practices. A Steering Committee at working level was established in February 2004.
Regular meetings now take place between staff from both organizations, involving, on the
side of the EU, the Policy Unit, the EU Military Staff, the Council Secretariat and the
Commission, and, on the side of the UN, DPA, DPKO, OCHA and the UN Situation Centre
(Manca, 2004); the NYLO acts as support for these contacts. A specific Council Working
Group, CONUN, covers EU-UN relations. At the administrative level the EU is thus very
much present.
The EU-25 contribute about 40 per cent of the UN’s peacekeeping budget, making the EU the
largest  contributor  by  far  (European  Union,  2004),  but  their  contribution  in  terms  of13
manpower is rather smaller. In November 2004 the EU-25 provided 4,836 military observers,
civilian police and troops for UN operations or only about 7.5 per cent out of a total of about
64,000 (UN, 2004). In recent years, the absolute numbers of EU troop contributions have not
varied that much, but the overall number of UN operations and of troops engaged has risen
enormously  –  e.g.  in  November  1998  only  about  15,000  troops  were  deployed  on  UN
operations – so the relative weight of the EU contribution has greatly diminished. This is a
distorted image however, since these figures only take into account operations under direct
UN command. EU Member States further contribute in much more substantial numbers to
operations mandated by the UN but undertaken by the EU and NATO: about 7,000 in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (EU operation Althea), over 16,000 in Kosovo (about 70 per cent of NATO’s
KFOR) and about 4,000 in Afghanistan (over 60 per cent of NATO-led ISAF). If these
operations are counted as well, the Member States are on average deploying some 32,000
men in support of the UN, which represents about half of the average total deployment of
European forces at any one time in 2003–2004.
The Member States seem to prefer operations on behalf of the UN, rather than contributing
troops to UN operations directly under the command of New York. This attitude appears to be
motivated inter alia by the experience of Rwanda, when communications between the UN
Headquarters and the force commander on the ground, and hence decision-making, proved to
be slow and cumbersome, which increases the risks for the troops in the field. It is evident
however that in all cases the political authority must remain with the Security Council: the
body that authorizes an operation and sets its objectives decides when the objectives have
been achieved, have to be adjusted or have to be abandoned. In practice however, the exact
nature  of  the  relationship  between  the  Security  Council  and  a  regional  organization
implementing an operation on its behalf is often far from clear.
The first ESDP military operation which the EU implemented completely autonomously, i.e.
without the use of NATO assets, was in fact an operation requested by the UNSC, which in
Resolution  1484  (30  May  2003)  authorized  the  deployment  of  an  ‘interim  emergency
multinational force’ in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where armed militias
threatened the security of the local population and humanitarian aid workers, in order to allow
the UN time to reinforce the military presence of MONUC, the UN mission, in the region.
The  EU  operation,  baptized  Artemis,  was  one  of  limited  scope,  in  time  (12  June  –  1
September 2003), in scale (about 2,000 deployed, including 400 at the support base at
Entebbe airport in Uganda) as well as geographically (securing the town of Bunia in the
Eastern province of Ituri), but it certainly was a high-risk operation, in an extremely volatile
environment, undertaken at very short notice at a great distance from the EU. Its successful
implementation served to boost Europe’s confidence in the abilities of ESDP. Artemis can be
seen as an expression of the EU’s commitment to the UN, as well as of its – developing –14
special interest in helping to maintain peace and security in Africa. The operation also
highlighted the need however to detail the relations between the UNSC and the EU when
acting on behalf of the former (Tardy, 2004, pp. 63-4). On a practical level, the EU and
France at first appeared reticent to communicate all information regarding the deployment. At
the political level, the EU apparently did not accept any subordination of the PSC to the
UNSC, though it did of course report to the Security Council on the implementation of the
mandate as stipulated in Resolution 1484.
Operation Artemis subsequently served as a model for the so-called ‘battlegroup’ concept.
Acting on the original proposal by France, Germany and the UK, the EU has decided to create
battlegroups, each some 1,500 strong (one combat battalion plus supporting units), which
must be able to deploy no later than ten days after an EU decision to launch an operation and
be sustainable for 120 days until the termination of the operation or relief by another, larger
and  longer-term  force.  By  2007  the  EU  aims  to  be  able  to  undertake  two  concurrent
battlegroup-sized operations. Member States’ commitments made in November 2004 are to
eventually create 13 national and multinational battlegroups. The EU has stated its intention
to deploy the battlegroups primarily at the request of the UN, either for small-scale stand-
alone operations, or as the initial entry force pending the deployment of a longer-term UN
operation (or an operation by another regional organization, such as the African Union), or as
an interim force between two such operations – the so-called bridging model. As the UN’s
force generation process tends to be rather cumbersome, this would represent a very welcome
addition to the UN’s capabilities. The High-Level Panel e.g. expressly welcomed the EU
initiative  and  recommended  that  ‘Others  with  advanced  military  capabilities  should  be
encouraged to develop similar capacities at up to brigade level and to place them at the
disposal of the United Nations’ (p.59).
However, a military contribution equal to its economic and political weight – and its share in
the UN’s peacekeeping budget – seems to demand a greater effort from the EU than the
implementation of the battlegroup concept. The offer to undertake interim operations for the
UN is extremely useful, but one would expect an effective commitment to e.g. peace in the
DRC also to be translated into long-term participation in peacekeeping, in casu MONUC.
Even when taking into account the participation of Member States’ forces in ‘subcontracted’
operations,  the  current  contribution  of  about  32,000  by  the  EU-25  does  not  seem
proportionate  to  their  combined  capacity  or  to  the  position  of  the  EU  in  the  UN.  In
comparison, in November 2004 the seven largest contributors of military forces and civilian
police together also provided over 32,000 personnel for ongoing UN operations: Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Nigeria, India, Ethiopia, Ghana and Nepal (the first two accounting for 8,212 and
7,503 respectively) – countries that do not exactly have the same wealth or sophisticated
military capabilities as the EU. It must also be noted that the UN-mandated EU and NATO15
operations are either taking place on the European continent, or, as regards Afghanistan, as a
follow-up to an initial operation of self-defence. The EU thus seems to assume only a limited
part of the UN’s responsibility for the maintenance of worldwide peace and security, apart
from its financial contribution to the peacekeeping budget. Mainly financing other States’
troops falls short however of the burden-sharing that can be expected from one of the most
powerful global actors. Likewise, highly commendable efforts to empower other regional
organizations to undertake peace support operations, such as the African Union through the
African Peace Facility, do not absolve the EU from its own responsibility, certainly not while
e.g. the AU’s capacity is still far from fully-fledged (Gowan, 2004). An increased EU
contribution of military and police forces is of paramount importance if the UN is to fulfil its
collective security role, for currently, in view of the number of crises, ‘there remains a glaring
gap between the demand and the supply of capable peacekeeping forces that the international
community can mobilize’ (O’Hanlon and Singer, 2004, p.79).
It has to be recognized that currently the EU is constrained by the limited deployability of a
large share of the Member States’ armed forces. It is recommendable therefore that in the
framework  of  ‘effective  multilateralism’  the  EU  would  include  a  future  larger-scale
contribution to UN-led or UN-mandated peace support operations around the world in the
objectives of the capability-building process in ESDP. While it is sometimes feared in New
York that less EU troops will be available for UN operations (Tardy, 2004, p.74), the further
development of ESDP should precisely enable the EU to contribute more.
Assigning forces to UN-led operations remains a national decision, on a case-by-case basis,
and several Member States have bilateral stand-by arrangements with DPKO in which they
commit to maintain specific capabilities on stand-by in order to be able to react rapidly if they
so wish to requests from the UN Secretary-General. This does not mean though that the
Member States cannot jointly undertake to increase their contribution, agree a quantitative
objective  and  take  that  into  account  when  planning  capability  needs  and  defining
requirements in the framework of ESDP. In its June 2004 declaration on EU-UN Cooperation
in Military Crisis Management Operations the European Council launched the idea of a
‘clearing house process’ as a complementary role for the EU in this regard, with the aim of
providing a framework for Member States to exchange information and coordinate their
national contributions to UN operations.
Similarly, a quantitative objective could be set, looking beyond the battlegroups and including
both military and civilian capabilities, with regard to EU operations at the request of the UN,
defining how many operations of which type – including peacekeeping – and at which scale
the EU would be willing to undertake. These could be short and long-term EU-led operations,
such as Artemis and Althea, under EU-command and under the political control of the16
Council  and  the  PSC  and  only  indirectly  of  the  Security  Council.  Perhaps  specific
components or modules within the structure of a broader UN mission could also be envisaged,
with  an  EU  force  commander  in  the  field,  but  under  the  operational  command  of  UN
Headquarters in New York and under the direct political control of the UNSC. In both cases
the  relations  between  the  various  bodies  involved  of  both  organizations  need  further
clarification. A specific type of high-intensity operation in which the UN is interested, but
with regard to which the EU appears rather reluctant, is that of an ‘over the horizon reserve’
or ‘extraction force’, i.e. an EU reserve force that would be on stand-by if rapid response were
required in support of a UN operation, e.g. in support of, or to evacuate, peacekeeping forces
in case of an escalation of violence.
The EU also has civilian capabilities to contribute to deploy as part of integrated civil-military
operations or for exclusively civilian missions. This is particularly relevant in the light of the
Panel’s recommendation to establish a Peacebuilding Commission, and a Peacebuilding
Support Office, to fill a gap in the institutional architecture of the UN and create a body that
can identify States in risk of collapse and coordinate international assistance to frail States
and  States  in  post-conflict  situations.  The  ongoing  development  of  the  EU’s  civilian
capabilities means that the EU could make an eminent contribution to such peacebuilding
missions.
6. Conclusion
In view of its political and economic weight, and of its actual financial contribution to the
UN, the EU as such enjoys the recognition of both the other members of the UN and the UN
bodies as an indispensable partner in the field of peace and security. Since the Iraq crisis of
early 2003, this recognition has increased as a consequence of the expression, throughout the
debate on the future of the UN, of strong EU support for the collective security system. EU
Member States have also shown a greater willingness to coordinate their actions within the
UN, and to contribute to the UN, both financially and militarily, although in the latter field an
enhanced contribution is required to fully reflect the EU’s weight. On the whole, on issues of
long-term stabilization and conflict prevention the EU does speak with a single voice in the
UNSC, in spite of the imperfections in the system of EU representation, in the sense of a lack
of formal mechanisms for the delegation of authority from the Council/PSC (principals) to the
Member States on the UNSC (agents) and, consequently, a large degree of autonomy for the
agents. The effects of these imperfections show themselves when the EU fails to achieve a
common position. In such cases of a lack of cohesion, which are most likely to occur with
regard to crisis response, the individual Member States are then free to defend their – often
contradictory – national positions and the EU as such is left without presence. A strong EU
foreign minister could potentially stimulate cohesion, but only a single EU seat in the UNSC
would completely resolve the issues of authority and autonomy. However, EU presence in the17
UN  suffers  from  the  same  disease  as  EU  presence  does  in  general:  the  unresolved
fundamental debate about the degree of ambition and autonomy vis-à-vis NATO and the US
of  the  EU  as  an  international  actor.  An  increased  contribution  of  military  and  civilian
capabilities is meaningless without the political will to make use of such assets when the need
arises. Only when this political issue is finally settled will the EU be able to emerge as a
resolute  international  actor  in  the  field  of  long-term  conflict  prevention  and  crisis
management.18
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